Pertti Joenniemi
International Academic Conference
Danish Institute for International Studies
Saint Petersburg, 24-25.10.2003
POST-ENLARGEMENT AND THE NORTHERN
DIMENSION:
FACING NEW CHALLENGES
Introduction
There has clearly been ups and downs during the short history of the
EU's Northern Dimension (ND). The initiative reflected, from the
very start, a rather optimistic face in pertaining to visions of
enlargement, the softening external borders as well as the creation
a much more region-based configurations, among other things by
extending influence also to the nearby areas. The ND contributes to
dimensionalism in being linked in particular to the various rounds
of EU enlargement. It does so by aiming at a downgrading of the
exclusionary aspects of the European project in being built on the
assumption of growing positive interdependence between the 'ins' and
the 'outs'.
However, the current prospects
are less optimistic in essence. No doubt, the task of organising the
fringes is still there, as has been the case also in the context of
previous enlargements. This endeavour is exemplified within the EU
above all by the creation of the Wider Europe framework, but it is
equally reflected in the Polish interest in launching an Eastern
Dimension (ED) along the lines of the northern one. But these trends
notwithstanding, it now appears that there prevails an accentuation
on a variety of more modern endeavours within the EU. There are
clear centrifugal tendencies to be discerned, these pointing
increasingly towards federalist structures. There is stress on the
creation of various state-like elements at a supra-national level
for example in the form of a post of a president as well as a
foreign minister. Instead of a previous tolerance for a certain
'fuzziness' in the composition of the EU, there appears to be a
process underway (albeit not always successfully) of reducing
various ambiguities concerning the form and nature of the Union. The
recent emphasis on joint arrangements of defence as well as the
interest shown in streamlining and formalising procedures of border
control are equally signs of the pursuance of more statist and
federalist policies.
Yet it has to be added that
though increasingly internally oriented and worried about 'institutional
overstretch', the EU has not turned away from the challenges faced
in its nearby areas. The Union has to remain aloof from impressions
that it is engaged in constructing normative and institutional walls
in order to shield itself from external influences. 'Fortress
Europe' still stands out a negative image, one that has to be
counteracted. Dimensionalism prevails, and this is also reflected in
the state of affairs as to the ND. As such, the Northern Dimension
has moved forward by the acceptance of a Second ND Action Plan
(2004-2006) at the European Council in October 2003, one stressing
complementarity, subsidiarity and synergy. The initiative certainly
figures on the EU's agenda, albeit is hardly to be described as
constituting a priority item attracting as much attention and
interest as it still did a few years back.
The Commission retains an overall leading role as to the ND at
large, albeit appears ready to pave more space for other actors such
as NGOs and international financial institutes, this also implying
that the burden of implementation and financing is shifting more to
local actors. In July 2003 the Commission took another step by
producing the communication “Paving the way for the New
Neighbourhood instrument”, one aiming at the adoption of a new,
single neighbourhood financial instrument. A similar endeavour of
harmonising the various, rather scattered EU-policies as to the
nearby areas has been noticeable in the strive towards a more
unified and coherent conceptual deparyure in the form of the “Wider
Europe” process. Instead of encouraging the spreading of additional
dimensions, some of them modelled on the ND, the European Commission
appears to aspire for developing a joint and overall process as
indicated by the communication given in March 2003 on “The Wider
Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our
Eastern and Southern Neighbours”. It appears to point to the
establishment of a ‘a ring of friends’ treated on the basis of a
coherent and uniform set of principles, and this instead of
respecting and making use of the specific conditions that constitute
largely the motivational ground for the ND.
The current situation may thus
be described, at least in some of its aspects, as something of a
down-turn. However, my aim here is basically to try to move beyond
the short-term fluctuations of optimism and pessimism, and instead
endeavour at grasping some of the more profound dynamics and trends
that are bound to determine the fate of the ND in the longer run. In
trying to get to the core relationships underlying the initiative, I
will focus exclusively on the EU/Russia relationship and scrutinise
the way this relationship appears to be playing out taking into
account the comprehensions of political space - and in that context
- regionalisation in terms of transboundary arrangements. The core
question reads: are these two actors sufficiently close to each
other as to the basic logics applied? Do the EU and Russia both
'read' and interprete the Northern Dimension in a manner that allows
them to invest in region-building and a variety of transborder
arrangements as part of their rule-governed policies, and are these
seen as condusive to a political landscape that they are both
interested in supporting and investing in?
My argument here is that this
has not necessarily been the case. There has not been a sufficient
meeting of minds during the past years, although the blame does not
seem to rest with Russia in a manner and to the extent usually
thought of. Primarily due to recent Russian development, a
convergence of thinking appears to be in the cards, with the
Northern Dimension possibly being on its way of turning - far more
than previously - into a joint platform of policies. The conversion
of the logics does not only augur further progress, thereby
undermining the more recent pessimistic predictions; it may also be
seen as inviting for a kind of change in the very nature of the
Northern Dimension as a EU/Russia platform.
The EU's Northern Dimension
The Northern Dimension has
been, quite rightly, described as the 'hole in the wall'. It aims at
contributing to co-operation that moves across strictly outlined
statist borders - being thereby condusive to the emergence of
dynamic, fluid and network-like regions. It challenges and goes
beyond modern conceptualisations of territoriality and borders
comprehended as containers of statehood. The ND may also be depicted
as a kind of market-place where the EU and Russia can, at least in
principle, meet on more equal grounds than would perhaps otherwise
be the case. It does so by granting Russia as one of the 'outs'
considerable subjectivity in providing EU members and non-members
(called 'partners') with a joint ground where to bring up and
discuss issues of mutual interests. This may occur without anybody
being discriminated against from the very start. The ND constitutes,
in this sense, a somewhat larger 'hole' than has been the case with
the Barcelona Process or, for that matter, the nascent Eastern
Dimension proposed by Poland. This state of affairs might, however,
be perceptive as being susceptive to changes. The 'hole' consisting
of the ND might, due to the impact of new policies introduced in the
context of the 'Wider Europe/New Neighbourhood" concept, be on its
way of narrowing down. This is so as the EU - according to a
communication issued by the Commission - aims at positioning the
previously separate dimensions as subordinated to the wider
framework of the Union's overarching neighbourhood policies.
Blurring the clear inside/outside division appears to be rather
challenging for the EU, and it seems that the Union is, in general,
moving towards somewhat more exclusionary policies than has been the
case previously.
This conclusion appears to
conflict with the oft repeated contention that the EU is basically a
postmodern configuration, and thereby forms an agent that is at ease
with fuzzy notions of territoriality and the blurring of distinct
external borders. Russia, in contrast, has been claimed to follow a
subtantively different - and more modern - logic. Hiski Haukkala,
for one, has stated that "....whereas the EU can be seen as moving
towards a post-modern and post-sovereign political system, the
Russian project is still very modern [i.e. statecentric,
sovereignty-affirming] in its essence (see, Hiski Haukkala, 'Two
Reluctant Regionalisers? The European Union and Russia in Europe's
North' UPI-FIIA Working Paper no. 32, Helsinki 2001, p. 9). While
the EU is, according to Haukkala, able to embrace a positive stance
towards the dual processes of globalisation and regionalisation,
Russia is perceived as wary of globalisation as a form of US
hegemony. It tends to comprehend regionalisation as a negative form
of fragmentation, which threatens Russia's very territorial
integrity.
Yet this way of framing the
issues at stake appears to call for a closer scrutiny. The EU forms,
no doubt, an agent of regionalisation, albeit there appears to be
significant constraints and conditions embedded in the EU's approach
as well. One of the conditions - present also in the case of the ND
- seem to be that cooperation in the context of border-trancending
endeavours aims at bringing about a convergence to the Union's
general standards. Pushing for regionalisation is hence rule-bound
and the configurations aspired for has to confirm and coinside with
a more general and established set of aspirations. The policies
pursued in the context of regionalisation are regular and formal -
as opposed to spontaneous, experimental and ac hoc-type of
arrangements. In fact, the relationship is often and adverse one
with the new, EU-initiated forms of cooperation taking place at the
expense of the latter ones. Shuttle-trading enabled by rather
relaxed border controls stands out as an obvious example of this. In
other words, the policies pursued by the Union also have a
destructive and conflict generating aspect.
On a principal level, the EU
tends to treat Russia and Russian regional actors in a rather
rule-governed manner. It does so without taking into account that
the rules are premised on assumptions of regularity that is not
always there. The Union's stress on governmentality in the form of
rules and regulations is hardly apt in situations containing a
considerable dose of openness, i.e. confrontations and encounters
that could be framed along the lines of a Schmittean approach by the
usage of terminologies like 'the moment of the political' (in
opposition to ordinary 'politics'). To the extent that the openness
that is there is comprehended, the Union's approach tends
nonetheless be one of closure in the name of 'stability' and
'predictability', that is aspiring for technical rather than
political and principal solutions ( political in the true sense of
politics).
Instead of accepting far-reaching openness and that there exists
exceptional cases calling for innovative and unconventional
approaches, the EU tends to emphasise the non-amendable nature of
its general, calculatively oriented and rather rationalist regimes,
i.e. regimes that hardly break with the 'modern' logic of
government.
Russian Challenges
With the EU seen as the leading regionaliser, Russia tends to be
depicted as a reluctant follower and a learner. However, it may also
on good grounds be claimed that Russia has in some sense been ahead,
although the Russian forms of regionalisation tend to have a
different character and background than those pursued by the EU
(this point has been well developed and elaborated by Sergei
Prozorov in his recent studies, see in particular Sergei Prozorov,
‘Border regions and the Politics of EU-Russian Relations. The Role
of the EU in tempering and Producing Border Conflicts’. Working
Paper no. 3, January 2004. EUBorderConf-project. University of
Birmingham).
In Russia's case regionalisation took, during the 1990s, place
largely in a rather spontaneous, experimental and often almost
anarchic manner. The pushing of power to regions and regional
leaders did not occur as something complemetary in view of the
policies pursued by the statist authorities, Rather, what occurred
consisted of a displacement of the authority of the upper levels by
that of the lower ones. Decentralisation did not occur as a policy
of innovation, one taking place by governmental design. Instead it
unfolded largely in the form of fragmentation. One could actually
argue, I think, that the process entailed a certain displacement of
statehood in the form of a complex web of practices along both
horizontal (the eminence and displacements of politics due to the
emergence of oligarks in the economic sphere) and vertical (the
appearance of strong regional leaders) axes.
These processes implied that Russia was radically decentred,
although more by default than by design. It boiled down to a rather
messy patchwork of overlapping polical spaces, a process hardly
condusive to political, economic or democratic reforms. This is so
as the joint space required for reforms to unfold in an acceptable
manner basically vanished. In aspiring for autonomy and competing
fiercely with aech other, the merging regions also were reluctant
about regionlisation.
I am hence claiming that the catchwords of 'neo-medievalism' and
'postmodernity' appear to be rather applicable in outlining
essential trends in the case of Russia. If the EU is on occasions
labeled as being postmodern, than Russia would qualify equally – if
nor more - towards the end of the Yeltsin era for the same label.
Unlike the EU, Russia's regionalisation was far from being
rule-bound or kept within bonds by a decidedly modern statehood
co-existing and guiding the unfolding of new regional
configurations. It relected, instead, undeniable pluralism, and in
this sense rather far-reaching postmodernism.
The Putin presidency has, if seen against this background, been one
of endeavouring at bringing the core back into the picture, and this
without infringing on Russia's federative structures as such. In
short, there has been an elimination of a number of previous
excesses. Notably, in this perspective, Russia increasingly
approaches the EU practices and policies in the sense that there is
space for regionalisation, albeit in a far more rule-governed form -
with rules provided by the general state policies. As stated
half-jokingly by Sergei Prozorov (Global Tensions and Strategies of
Relief: Three Theses on ‘Governance’ and the Political. Paper
presented at the CIEESA conference in Budapest, June 2003): Russia
thus appears to be on its way of turning post-postmodern. It does so
by increasingly representing a less extreme version of postmodernity
- and in this sense also moving closer to the model and approaches
applied by the EU.
In Conclusion
This tendency might, in general, be comprehended as good news,
albeit it would be overly optimistic to expect that this will
instantly push the ND back on the stage. The process will in all
probability remain a gradual one. Russia might be on its way of
assuming postures closer to those hold by the Union. It is even
possible that Russia endeavours of becoming something of a driving
force advocating 'grand strategies' and bold steps rather than
cautious piecemal approaches, whereas the EU's position could turn
more defensive. Yet it can be noted that some of the Russian regions
(oblasts and krais) might still remain somewhat uneasy about
transborder regionalisation, and this has to be remedied by
providing the local entities as well as actors such as the
North-West Federal District with increased backing in the sphere of
regionalisation. The regions that unfolded during the Yeltsin era
still tend to remain internally oriented and shield themselves from
external influences, including those eminating with transborder
regionalisation. It is also required, it seems to me, that the EU to
some extent opens up for more spontaneous and innovative forms of
regionalisation. Instead of just remaining with tactical
problem-solving, peripheral projects undertaken on the Union's own
terms and pursuing policies of aiming at softening various so-called
'soft security' threats in the name of aspiring for stability and
orderly contact, the EU should be aiming at the adoption of more
demanding ambitions. A certain openness will, no doubt, remain in
Europe's North and to be discernible particularly in the encounter
between the EU's and Russia's North. Instead of mere governance and
strictly rule-bound and harmonious regionalisation, the parties have
to tune themselves to more innovative forms of politics, and this is
increasingly what the challenges pertaining to the Northern
Dimension will be about in the years ahead.
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© Pertti Joenniemi 2004
