THE FOUR COMMON SPACES BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE EU: ERASING OLD OR BUILDING NEW DIVIDES?
Alexey V. Tyazhov, Central European University
Introduction
On May 10, 2005 during the EU-Russia summit, the widely advertised signing of the agreement between the EU and Russia on the Four Common Spaces has taken place, accompanied by the adoption of the road maps on each of them. The road maps contain the main lines of action for all the four spaces - on the Common Economic Space, the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice, the Common Space of External Security and the Common Space on Research, Education and Culture. This event was exceptionally well appreciated by the Russian establishment. President Putin, for instance, claimed that “the adoption of the road maps on the common spaces between Russia and the EU will move the process of building the united Europe ahead”
[1] and “will create the condition for free intercourse between people”, “will multiply the opportunities for cooperation”
[2].
Not everyone, however, met this occurrence in the relations between the EU and Russia with blind optimism and regard it exceptional; some instead even started raising concerns about its nature and, obviously, as it is made clear below, they had every reason for that. This article attempts to revise the understanding of the concept and to have a look at the latest developments in the EU-Russia relations, including the “four common spaces”, from another perspective, as opposed to the “conventional”, official view.
A Systemic Crisis?
These days the relations between Moscow and Brussels are steadily moving closer and closer to the boundary, beyond which the re-evaluation of the components of interaction should take place. Obviously, neither Russia nor the EU is completely satisfied with the general condition of the relations and the behaviour of the counterpart.
The legal basis of the EU-Russia relations, for instance, remains on the lowest possible level. The Common Strategy on Russia, though declarative but still containing the long-term vision of Russia as an element of united Europe
de jure lost its validity in 2004, and de facto died a year before.
[3] In 2007 the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) signed in 1994
[4] will also cease to exist. There is a possibility that due to the fact that not all of the provisions of the PCA were implemented it will not be substituted by a document equal in status to the previous one. The very idea of the four common spaces is not a legally defined term. From the political point of view, the substance of the “spaces” doesn’t seem to benefit Russia either.
[5]. At the moment Russia is facing the challenge of getting the road maps instead of an agreement, the key term in which is
dialogue. An average person is sure to find it very complicated to realize the difference and the practical meaning of such statements as “establishing dialogue”, “intensifying cooperation” and “enhancing partnership”
[6], what, in the words of Michael Emerson, highly resembles “Euro-Russki diplomatic-bureaucratic
borsch.” [7]
There are also more concrete pieces of evidence of crisis settled in the EU-Russia relations. The first evidence was the tense discussion over the Kaliningrad problem. As many experts highlight, it was then that Russia and the EU understood that in spite of the ambitious agenda, they still “speak different languages”.
[8] Then the hard-edged and nit-picking position of the EU during the negotiations on Russia’s accession to the WTO gave rise to a wave of criticisms with such terms as “Brussels bureaucracy” and “twisting arms” used on a regular basis. The next symptoms were the political rows over Transdnestria and the stretching of the PCA to the newly accepted countries in 2004.
Therefore, reverting to the perception of the signing of the agreement, the cautiousness of the expert community in assessing the initiative comes as no surprise. As many think, the problem here is one of interpretation, or, in other words, the meaning that one attaches to the concept. Moscow is demanding to be treated as a privileged partner and the concept of the “four common spaces” is seen in this sense. “We do not accept the idea of Russia being built into this wide space. It is impossible, given the progressing nature of the EU-Russia relations, to place Russia on the same footing as Morocco”, says an anonymous source in the Kremlin
[9].
The position of the EU towards Russia, however, may be characterized in one word as ambivalent. On the one hand, European officials of all possible ranks keep making statements concerning the exceptional role of Russia for the Union. Romano Prodi, for instance, during the Moscow summit in 2004 said that “Russia and the EU supplement each other as caviar and vodka”
[10]. On the other hand, however, virtually none of the Russian demands during the last few years was satisfied by the EU (the EU recognized Russia as a country with market economy only after the US had done so, negotiations on Kaliningrad issue failed, Brussels shows very little concern about the situation with human rights in the Baltic states and even when the criticisms are heard, they more resemble mild rebukes).
Apart from that, in the economic sphere the EU fights for every small item that sometimes highly resembles nit-picking. In 2003 President Putin said, “We constantly hear the assurances from the EU of its support of Russia’s accession to the WTO. But in practice, unfortunately, time after time we encounter unjustifiably strict demands which practically block the accession of Russia to the WTO”
[11]. Alas, not much has changed since 2003 in that sense.
The situation is exacerbated by the fact that the EU is itself experiencing a serious crisis. The collapse of the European constitutional project and the inability of the European leaders to agree on the budget of the Union marked the beginning of the process of rethinking what had already been achieved and the development of a new, more stable model of development. The so-called “crisis of identity” of the European Union, coinciding with the systemic crisis in the EU-Russia relations results in some very unpleasant developments.
Along with the decrease of popularity of the integrationist idea, the authority of the controlling organs of the EU was also shaken. Having got stuck in internal discussions, the Commission decided to increase its prestige at the expense of external partners, including Russia
[12]. The most striking example is the demand of the European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso from Russia to stop charging compensations from European airlines for the flights over Siberia and to lift all limitations on access to Russian airspace for the European airlines. Otherwise Barroso threatened once again to reconsider the EU position on agreeing to Russia's accession to the WTO
[13].
Apart from the fact that such claims are illegitimate and financial issues set aside, it is unbearable for Moscow to give up a certain amount of its sovereign rights as this may lead to much more serious problems. In May 2004 before the signing of the Russia-EU protocol on Russia's WTO accession Russian Economic Development and Trade Minister German Gref and EU trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy agreed to modernize the system of payments after 2013, though as it turned out later Lamy had no authority to raise this issue.
[14] They even agreed to start developing a comprehensive agreement on cooperation in the sphere of air transport, but this notwithstanding, in a year cooperation was forgotten and the Commission simply suggested Russia’s giving up its positions promising in return the same (many times paid for) carrot of the WTO accession.
[15] It is notable that the market of air trafficking “Europe – Asia” is one of the fastest growing in the world”
[16]. Both Russia and Europe were involved in cynical practice of trying to distract the public attention from the internal problems by waging “a small victorious war”
[17]. Nonetheless it has never led to the desired outcomes just aggravating the crisis.
Therefore, the signing of the agreement instead of being a step of crucial importance turns out to be more of a political gesture “to cover up the conceptual vacuum in the relations”.
[18] As for such a crucial issue as transborder cooperation, for instance, the aim of the cooperation in this sphere is defined as “deepening and diversification of interregional cooperation” with the concrete actions as “active support to cross-border initiatives and programmes”, “encouraging the involvement of local and regional key actors…in all aspects of cross-border co-operation”, “further deepening of cooperation and facilitation of investments”, “establishing and strengthening of economic and people-to-people links between Russian and EU regions”
[19]. As for the issues of the borders and migration, the agreement presupposes the necessity to “demarcate borders between the EU Member States and Russia that are presently not demarcated”, “intensify discussions on border management, including border protection”, “explore the possibilities of cooperation at operational level, where appropriate, between the EU and Russia in the framework, principally of the EU’s future border management agency”, “implement the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air, supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime”, “provide appropriate support to the Border Guards Service with the possibility to set up Joint Training Programmes and Training Centres for Customs Officers and Border Guards.”
[20]
These are, undoubtedly, rather laudable ideas, though by their nature they are closer to declarations than to practical recommendations, what is actually needed in the Russian regions bordering on the EU. There is an opinion in the expert community that the whole concept of the “spaces” may be just a loose framework, with concrete actions and projects being added to it
ad hoc, what may be disadvantageous for Russia, as, given the weak negotiating abilities of Moscow it may enable Brussels to fill the agenda with its initiatives blocking the ones coming form Russia
[21].
What to do?
Therefore it is vital to start negotiating a new basic agreement on relations before the PCA has lost its validity; otherwise Moscow faces the risk of remaining in institutional vacuum or only with the “spaces”. Before that, however, both partners have to change their approaches to interaction. Russia, in particular, has to realise and rank its priorities in all the spheres of interaction, devise a long-term strategy and finally understand what goals it is pursuing during the interplay with the EU. Does Moscow want to gradually integrate into the Union, at least to some extent, or is it preferable to pursue only economic integration, or does Russia want to position itself as an independent centre of power?
During the negotiations it is also necessary for Moscow to change its
modus operandi showing more initiative concerning particular areas of cooperation and to learn to bargain better. As President Putin said during the reception in honour of the Day of Europe, “At times I thought our ministers will have a heart attack because of their European counterparts. We should learn form the Europeans how to defend our positions”
[22]. Until now Moscow had the most heated debates with Brussels over a number of issues, such as human rights, Chechnya, Kaliningrad transit issue, the influence over the post-Soviet area, issues where the debates may go on for years without any success; at the same time, Russia keeps making concessions on economic matters. This practice seems to be defective and thus should be abandoned.
Possibly, Russian failures during the interactions with the EU are determined by the wrong perception of the nature of the EU as an actor on the international arena. Russia still treats the EU as a “normal”, “conventional” actor which can be forced to change the decision by bargaining, using leverages and engaging resources. This is radically wrong. Had the EU been a geopolitical actor, it would have incorporated Ukraine and Belarus into its sphere of influence paying a blind eye to the weakness of their economies and human rights abuses to prevent Russia from controlling them. But the Union does not act this way.
In fact, the EU is, metaphorically speaking, a unique entity in international relations, it is a mass of laws and rules regulating virtually all possible aspects of life. That is the reason why during the negations with the Union one should not try to bargain with concrete officials or political leaders, but fight using the same weapon – the knowledge of the EU legislative process.
The European Union is a post-modern entity not built on the principles of
Realpolitik; in its course of actions it is more likely to follow the “logic of appropriateness” as opposed to the “logic of consequentiality”
[23] and that is the reason why it cannot make an exception, on what Russia insists, as it may create a perilous precedent which may jeopardise the very existence of the Union. Possibly, what underlies all these problems is the fact that neither Russia nor the EU is willing to recognise the crucial differences between them. Perhaps Mr Prodi’s metaphor about caviar and vodka was right. Russia and the EU may supplement each other but still they are fundamentally different substances.
Conclusions
We can better understand the declaratory nature of the “spaces” by looking at them a perspective different from that of the authorities. We should regard them not a concrete plan of action, but as a “carrot” offered by the EU for Russia. In spite of the obvious concern with the latest developments in Russia (including de-democratisation and economic and political hardships), the EU for some reason doesn’t use the “sticks” it has, but “carrots”.
Perhaps, it may follow from the identity of the Union, committed to the “logic of appropriateness”
[24], perhaps due to the fact that the EU is mostly civilian and “soft” power: the EU does not aim to impose but to persuade its neighbours; it does not aim to coerce them but to attract them. Thus, in this sense the four spaces may be regarded as a “carrot”, offered by the EU for Russia, not an important victory as it is often positioned by the Russian authorities.
Apart from that it may be useful to see the spaces exactly this way for another reason. Possibly, this may explain the declaratory nature of the road maps. Indeed they seem to be very little but the declaration of intentions. So if we look at them as a carrot, it explains everything – Russia will get more concrete promises only when it changes in the way that is seen suitable from Brussels. As Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner put, “the further a partner is ready to go in taking practical steps to implement common values, the further the EU will be ready to go in strengthening our links with them”
[25], but this may be as well applied to the “spaces”. In fact, initially the “spaces” were explicitly intended to serve the purpose of conditionality. France and Italy supported the Russian position that the four “road maps” should be adopted separately, rather than as one package
[26]. But, as Michael Emerson notes, a large majority of member states were, however, against the proposal to implement the common economic space while leaving other common spaces, such as the one on freedom, security and justice, to be agreed upon at some later date as it was only in this latter document that adherence to common values such as democracy, the rule of law and human rights featured, therefore it would become an example of conditionality
[27]. In the words of the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, for instance, in 2003 “the forth, "human" dimension of the common space with Russia [the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice] is of vital importance for the successful implementation of the first three ones”
[28]. In 2004 he was more concrete: “The main source of our concerns today is the deepening deficit of democracy in the majority of our Eastern neighbours. […] Russia has certainly become more stable and predictable, yet there are legitimate concerns about its record on democracy, in particular the freedom of the media and its policies towards some of the former Soviet republics. The message Europe sends out to Russia must be clear, leaving no room for ambiguity”
[29]. Thus, Poland, as one representative of the “new” Europe has a clear cut position on the initiative, using the progress on the common spaces as a leverage to foster internal changes in Russia.
But, if we follow the proposed logic, it is clear that unless Russia changes it will have to wait for a very long time to get something concrete from Brussels, as the EU tends to make a strong emphasis on human rights, the issue with which Russia has very big problems. So the way to fruitful cooperation is, strange it may seem, internal changes, i.e. reforms that will eventually lead to a more open, transparent and democratic state, to democracy without such attributes as “illiberal” or “controlled”.
In a word, President Putin got into the situation generally described as rhetorical entrapment. While abroad, though just “talking the talk”, he showed commitment to the western values, democracy and human rights, though the real implementation is just on the level of communicative action. But now, when these are demanded by the EU, the choice is not very ample – either to modernise and get closer to the Union, or to stay the same and remain to be “the Other” for the Union with very uncertain prospects of more fruitful cooperation than just simply selling gas.
(1) - “Rossiya i ES dogovorilis o dorozhnih kartah chetyreh prostranstv” (Russia and the EU have agreed on the road maps of the four common spaces),
Finansovye Izvestiya; available at
http://www.finiz.ru/cfin/tmpl-art_news/id_art-921313;
accessed last October 28, 2005
>>>
(2) - “Rossiya i Evropa budut zhit po novomu atlasu” (Russia and Europe will live by a new atlas); available at
http://74.rosfirm.ru/companies_news?news_id=34971;
accessed last October 29, 2005
>>>
(3) - For details see Arkadiy Moshes, “Eshe raz o plusah evropeiskogo vybora” (Once again about the benefits of choosing Europe)
Russia in Global Affairs ¹ 4, 2005, p. 111-120.
>>>
(4) - The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement was signed in 1994 but due to the problems accompanying the ratification came into force only in 1997.
>>>
(5) - Sergei Karaganov et al., Russia-EU Relations. The Present Situation and Prospects. The Council on Foreign and Defence Policy, 2005; available at
www.svop.ru
; downloaded last May 15, 2005. >>>
(6) - Vadim Kononenko, “A Road Map to Nowhere” Moscow Times May 14, 2005.
>>>
(7) - Michael Emerson, EU-Russia. Four Common Spaces and the Proliferation of the Fuzzy CEPS Policy Brief No. 71/May 2005; available at
http://www.ceps.be;
downloaded October 20, 2005 >>>
(8) - Timophei Bordachev and Arkadiy Moshes, “Rossiya: konez evropeizazii?” (Russia: the end of Europeanisation?) Russia in Global Affairs ¹ 2, 2004, p.104 -117.
>>>
(9) - Dmitri Suslov, “Rossiya i ES kak ikra i vodka” (Russia and EU as caviar and vodka); available at
http://intellectuals.ru/cgi-bin/proekt/index.cgi?action=articul&statya=viewstat&id=20040430203326
; accessed last October 21, 2005 >>>
(10) - “Rossiya i ES dopolnyajut drug druga kak ikra I vodka” (Russia and the EU supplement each other as caviar and vodka) Itogi, 25.05.2004, available at
http://www.itogi.ru;
accessed last October 21, 2005 >>>
(11) - Yury Borko, “Dvusmyslennoe partnerstvo” (Ambiguous partnership),
Gazeta.ru, 09.01.2004. >>>
(12) - Dmitry Suslov, Russia-EU: No More Concessions? 7.10.2005 The Council on Foreign and Defence Policy; available at
http://www.svop.ru
; accessed last October 22, 2005 >>>
(13) - For details see Dmitry Suslov, Russia-EU: No More Concessions? 7.10.2005 The Council on Foreign and Defence Policy; available at http://www.svop.ru; accessed last October 22, 2005; Sergei Karaganov, “Malenkaya pobedonosnaya voina?”,
Rossiskaya Gazeta, 05.07.05; available at
http://www.rg.ru/printable/2005/07/05/voina.html
; accessed last October 21, 2005 >>>
(14) - For details see Fiodor Lukyanov, “Dva liza bolshoi evropy” (Two faces of big Europe)
Profil, ¹11 (426), 28.03.2005; available at
http://www.profile.ru/items/?item=11133;
accessed last October 21, 2005 >>>
(15) - Sergei Karaganov, “Malenkaya pobedonosnaya voina?”,
Rossiskaya Gazeta, 05.07.05; available at
http://www.rg.ru/printable/2005/07/05/voina.html
; accessed last October 21, 2005 >>>
(16) - Dmitri Suslov, Evropieskiy vybor pod voprosom (European choice questioned) The Council on Foreign and Defence Policy; available at
http://www.svop.ru/live/materials.asp?m_id=22261&r_id=22262;
accessed last October 21, 2005 >>>
(17) - Sergei Karaganov, “Malenkaya pobedonosnaya voina?”
Rossiskaya Gazeta, 05.07.05; available at
http://www.rg.ru/printable/2005/07/05/voina.html;
accessed last October 21, 2005 >>>
(18) - For details see Sergei Karaganov “Rossiya i Evropa: trudnoe sblizhenie” (Russia and Europe: difficult rapprochement) The Council on Foreign and Defence Policy; available at
http://www.svop.ru/live/news.asp?n_id=24504;
accessed last October 21, 2005 >>>
(19) - The EU-Russia agreement on the Four Common Spaces of May 10, 2005. The Road Map for the Common Economic Space; available at
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/summit_05_05/finalroadmaps.pdf
>>>
(20) - See The EU-Russia agreement on the Four Common Spaces of May 10, 2005. The Road Map for the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice; available at
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/summit_05_05/finalroadmaps.pdf
>>>
(21) - Sergei Karaganov et al., Russia-EU Relations. The Present Situation and Prospects. The Council on Foreign and Defence Policy, 2005; available at
www.svop.ru
; downloaded last May 15, 2005 >>>
(22) - Evgeniya Pyadysheva, “Kuda vedet dorozhnaya karta?” (Where does the road map lead to?), available at
http://customs.net.ru/index.phtml?t=3&id=10733; accessed last October 21, 2005
>>>
(23) - James March and Johan Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: the Organisational Basis of Politics
(New York: Free Press, 1989), p. 115. >>>
(24) - Ibid., p.115.
>>>
(25) - Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Press conference to launch first seven Action Plans under the European Neighbourhood Policy, Brussels, 9 December 2004 cited in Fabrizio Tassinari,
Security and Integration in the EU Neighbourhood The Case for Regionalism CEPS Working Document No. 226/July 2005; available at
http://www.ceps.be
; downloaded October 20, 2005
>>>
(26) - Ahto Lobjakas, “EU: Foreign Ministers to Discuss Iraq, Iran, Russia, Belarus”, 2 November 2004, Radio Free Europe (RFE) newsline; quoted in Michael Emerson, Democratisation in the European Neighbourhood, Centre for European Policy Studies. 2005; available at
http://www.ceps.be
; downloaded October 20, 2005
>>>
(27) - For details see: Michael Emerson, Democratisation in the European Neighbourhood, Centre for European Policy Studies. 2005; available at
http://www.ceps.be;
downloaded October 20, 2005 >>>
(28) - “What does Poland has to Offer in the Design of a New Eastern Policy?” Think Tank Forum 2003 The EU’s New Neighbourhood: Strategies for an Eastern policy for the Enlarged Union” / Konrad Adenauer Stiftung - 01.07.2003; available at the Polish Foreign Ministry official Internet site
http://www.msz.gov.pl/
; last accessed November 2, 2005
>>>
(29) - April 22, 2004 - "The Eastern Policy of the European Union” - speech by W³odzimierz Cimoszewicz, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, Paris, Institute of Political Science; available at the Polish Foreign Ministry official Internet site
http://www.msz.gov.pl/
; last accessed November 2,2005 >>>
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