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THE FOUR SPACES AND FOUR FREEDOMS IN THE RUSSIA - EU RELATIONS (INTAS Project)

INTAS ( http://www.intas.be ) - The International Association for the Promotion of Co-operation with Scientists from the New Independent States (NIS) of the Former Soviet Union is an independent International Association formed by the European Community, European Union Member States and like-minded countries to promote East-West scientific co-operation between INTAS members and INTAS-NIS partner countries. INTAS supports both fundamental and applied research in all fields of science, such as: Physics; Chemistry; Life Sciences; Earth Sciences & Environment; Economics, Social & Human Sciences; Mathematics & IT; Space, Aeronautics & Engineering.

Research Bulletin 1

 

THE FOUR FREEDOMS AND THE FOUR SPACES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE PATHWAYS OF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND RUSSIA

 Introductory Paper

 Dr. Andrey Makarychev

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union have brought about numerous dramatic shifts in the EU – Russian relations. A number of most recent developments have sharpened the interest to this part of the world in both political and academic circles: the simultaneous accession of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to NATO and EU; EU’s adoption of the concept of the “New Neighborhood” policy; the emergence of the Eastern Dimension blueprint sponsored by Poland; the scaling back of the U.S. involvement in the BSR (in particular, the de-facto termination of the Northern European Initiative); the appearance of “Old” vs. “New” Europe divide, discursively framed and politically accentuated; a clearer articulation of the importance of contacts with key CIS countries in foreign policies of the Baltic countries; the “technical solution” of the Kaliningrad problem.

The general conceptual background of this project-to-be has to be formulated in terms of institutionalism. We shall focus our attention on institutional factors shaping the Four Freedoms implementation, including existing policy making bodies, organizations and programs that have their impact upon the state of EU-Russian affairs, etc. Touching upon the consequences of the EU eastward expansion, the project participants are also to employ the key assumption of the school of neofunctionalism, as a leading theory explaining the logic of integration. Institutionalist – functionalist nexus could be well compatible with conceptualizations developed within the regionalist literature, predominantly those related to trans-border communications and the international actorship of sub-national territorial units as applicable to the general topic of the project research.

This general conceptual framework will be supplemented by a number of other topic-specific approaches that are to make the overall output more sophisticated and variegated. Thus, some traditions of the peace research school are expected to make use of such concepts as bordering and de-bordering, securitization and de-securitization, marginality, spatiality, and some others. Within the peace research framework, it is feasible to combine the general institutionalist / functionalist approach with more subtle and nuanced constructivist / cognitivist departures, basically while speaking of the importance of identity factors in the topics under consideration.

Another important addition to the project concept is an accent on the issues of the state - civil society relations as seen from the perspectives of the EU – Russia interactions. This aspects – drawing upon trans-nationalist theoretical background - implies more attention to NGOs in the EU – Russia relationship, different conceptualizations of transparency and accountability, etc.

This introductory paper argues that the Four Freedoms – Four Spaces nexus could be represented through a matrix of different communicative pathways that shape the state of the EU – Russia relations. The structure of this paper develops the logic embedded in this argument.

 ***

The conditions predetermining the EU impact upon Russia in the Four Freedoms / Four Spaces implementation process might be elucidated through the scheme elaborated earlier within the framework of the Euborderconf project [1] (2003-2005). However, for the needs of the current INTAS project, the template offered by Thomas Dietz and his colleagues – that one containing “compulsory”, “connective”, “enabling” and “constructive” types of influence - has to be modified to include a number of other pathways of the EU – Russia communication. In fact, three main additions to the Euborderconf scheme could be proposed.

Firstly, what is called a structural type of influence (with two variations – “enabling”, i.e. pointed to the political elites, and “constructive”, i.e. pointed to the civil society institutions) could be divided into: a) multi-actor impact, which could be presented by “the EU plus” formula, and b) networking (horizontal and de-centered) impact. Secondly, one may certainly imagine the existence of the zones of inter-subjective interaction between the EU and Russia, where both parties communicate with each other as partners, and, concomitantly, not only the EU is capable of exerting some influence upon Russia, but Russia too may have her say. Thirdly, apart from political leaders and civil society institutions, as either the objects of the EU impact or parties in inter-subjective exchanges, the business community has to be necessarily added to this list.

 The modified table which might be offered in accordance to the notes mentioned above is given below.

  Actor-driven (EU-centered) Multy-actor ("EU plus") Networking Inter-sujective
Political elites and institutions 1: The EU policies aimed at Russian political leaders 2: The pathway of communication with the Russian political establishment in which the EU is not the only actor (EU plus NATO, the Visegrad Four, etc.) 3: Personal liaisons between the political leaders 4: Areas where the Russian state may claim its subjectivity (diplomatic talks concerning the Four Spaces)
Civil Society 5: The EU policies towards the civil society in Russia (TACIS/TEMPUS programmes) 6: The pathway of communication with the civil society organizations in which the EU is not the only actor (EU plus Council of Europe, INTAS) 7: Communication through epistemic communities, public policy centers, and educational programmes 8: Areas where the Russian civil society structures may have some influence upon their European counter-parts (Diaspora links)
Business Organizations 9: The EU policies directed towards the business community of Russia 10: The pathway of communication with the business organizations in which the EU is not the only actor (EU plus WTO) 11: Business networks 12: Areas where the actorship of the Russian business could be identified (the energy sector)

Some important comments to this scheme ought to be made.

Square 1 seems to be rather close to what Thomas Dietz calls a compulsory impact, a form of influence by conditionality, or outside pressure which fosters changes in functioning of institutions. EU assistance might be a meaningful catalyst for political change and fostering accountability and transparency of local bureaucracies [2]. Most valuable are those projects aimed at modifying the functioning of the least reformed and most red-tape institutions.

For compulsory impact to be feasible, a number of conditions have to be met. For the EU, the basic problem is that “the Big Carrot” is in fact missing as an instrument to make Russia more compliant with the EU-established norms. Conditionality may work, therefore, in a limited number of circumstances, like Russia’s accession to the WTO, the Kyoto protocol ratification, and perhaps the issue of the European investments in Russia’s North West. This is in this context that Alexei Tyazhov’s paper – offering a number of critical departures - has to be inscribed into the project framework. Olga Nazarova’s outlook, based upon an analysis of the German perspective, gives some additional food for thought in this direction.

Square 2 appears to be close to an enabling impact. The main driving force here is a dispersed power which ought to entail a number of pathways of appealing to certain groups within Russian political elites and mobilizing them. Within this type of impact, the EU operates as one of the group of actors, as part of what might be called, following the traditions of the English school, the international society. Some of the arguments developed by Svetlana Anischenko and Yulia Ovchinnikova partly reflect this way of reasoning.

Enabling type of impact could be conceptualized through two interrelated notions. One of them is permeability, i.e. a set of communicative and learning abilities of political elites, and their sensitivity to foreign environment. A group of German authors deems that “organization of regional governance is the decisive variable to explain the learning capacity of a region” [3].

The second concept is mutability, to be manifested through elites’ intentions to reshape the domestic procedures in accordance with international norms [4].

This pattern of impact, aimed at strengthening some of the identity-related features pertaining to political elites, could be viewed through a prism of the concept of consociations, which combines the cultural symbolization of policy ideas with certain degree of formalization through providing organizational rules and procedures. A set of “consociational” policy frameworks that have emerged at the vicinity of Russian westernmost regions offered inclusive opportunities for enabling the trans-border interactions. The Nordic countries, in particular, are important gravitation poles.

Square 3 represents a networking type of influence that involves mainly the political elites. The key assumption at this point is that the political elites, as represented by different fractions, have their own circles of communication, including informal ones (what sometimes is expressed by a metaphor “meetings without neck-ties”). Andrey Dakhin’s paper published in this Bulletin nicely fits into this logic.

Square 4 identifies the zones of interaction between the two subjects in transformation, the EU and Russia. This type of communication covers those areas where the Russian diplomacy has achieved some degree of effect having altered the EU policies.

Square 5 points to the EU policies meant for the “third sector” in Russia. It may be assumed that it is close to what Thomas Dietz calls a connective type of influence. Its implementation is dependent upon the attractiveness of ideas that are circulated (concerning human rights, ecology, security, globalization, federalism and subsidiarity, etc.); social, economic, political, educational and managerial practices that are introduced; and social norms (like coroprate charity, volunteering, ethic codes, lobbying, etc.) to be strengthened.

The implementation of this type of impact is conditioned by its split into several levels: cognitive level (as exemplified by a plethora of actors working with information, ideas, orientations and attitudes); political level (“policy transfer” practices); and institutional level where actors communicate with each other and form networks (coalitions). Liliana Proskuriakova’s contribution to this Research Bulletin evidently focuses on some of these issues.

Square 6 indicates the pathway of multi-actor communication between the variety of international organizations (the EU included) and the civil society organizations within Russia. By and large, it may be manifested through the expansion of the social scope of beneficiaries of joint programmes, involvement of citizens into community affairs, increased investments in human and intellectual capital, the emergence of synergetic effect based on appearance of gravitation poles of different initiatives in regional communities, and the consolidation of democratic practices, including: a) identification and promotion of those groups in the society that are prone to form pluralist liberal principles of political order; b) limitation of the roles of the radical groups in the process of setting the regional democratic order [5].

Square 7 comes back to a networking type of influence, yet this time involving the civil society institutions. In terms of Thomas Dietz, it gravitates to a constructive impact that leads to identity changes and forms “a web of overlapping and intertwining political, legal and moral commitments that act as the guiding principles for the evolving interaction between Russia and Europe” [6]. What is peculiar in networking resources is that they are indivisible (it can’t be split apart and divided among all parties involved) and spread all across the partnership (it can’t be exclusively managed by a single participant). Networking divests the state of its formerly unchallenged status of exclusive decision maker, and pushes the state bureaucracy to get into dialogue with resourcefull communities of experts and social leaders. Networking combines two different principles – competition and cooperation. Its effectiveness might be explained in terms of facilitating access to key resources and knowledge, lowering the risks, and speeding up innovations. Networking leads to growing integrity within specific social and economic segments, be it business community or the world of NGOs. Networking strategies of NGOs include important social dimensions (information sharing, education, use of intellectual capital and know how, appearance of joint values and shared ethics, interlacing of responsibility, etc.). Networking relations are primarily about mutual agreements, including informal ones, and trust.

Square 8 points to the possibilities of the Russian society to exert some influence upon the state of affairs in the European countries. Perhaps one of the most tenable examples is the Russian-speaking Diaspora in the Baltic countries which possesses its own channels of communication with Russia through media, arts, family communications and professional networks (again, the reference to Andrey Dakhin’s comments could be appropriate here).

Squares 9 deals with the EU-based policies aimed at the Russian business community. The Four Freedoms concept seems to be highly relevant for illustrating this type of impact.

Square 10 covers the area of joint (for example, EU – WTO) policies which aim at changing some of the business legislation and business practices in Russia. This type of influence ought to lead to greater compatibility with the international norms. The most illustrative example is local enterprises’ voluntary acceptance of European quality standards to get better deals with foreign contractors.

Square 11 may be filled with the analysis of different types of business networks that link the Russian and European entrepreneurs.

Square 12 points to the areas where the Russian industrial and/or financial institutions may be considered as being able to exert certain influence upon the European economic milieu.

***

Ideally, each of the communicative pathways should be presented in two ways. Firstly, some cues should be given on how the Four Freedoms and Four Spaces concepts could be inscribed into it. On a preliminary note, one may hypothesize that in some of the squares the Four Freedom – Four Spaces problematique ought to be quite visible, while in others it may be absent at all.

Secondly, it would be expedient to provide some ideas on how the border regions could be taken into account in terms of the Four Freedoms – Four Spaces implementation. The role of the sub-national regions under new arrangements has to be analyzed in order to identify their functional niches in the framework of the EU – Russia relations.

It could be assumed actually that we have to distinguish between the central and non-central elites. On the one hand, the more Moscow-centric is the Russian political space, the fewer chances the EU gets to have a say in its transformation. Since Moscow is eager to be the key voice in formulating the basics of national interests for the entire country, this is basically the federal elite that claim that Russia is not to become “an object of civilizational impact from the part of other states”. Yet on the other hand, it is basically centers that stand out as driving forces of integration. Moscow (as any capital) is the most urbanized and westernized of Russia’s cities, and in this capacity it has to be regarded as a natural interface with the EU. Therefore, the issue of finding a right balance between influencing the central and non-central actors seems to be of crucial importance for the EU.


(1) - Diez, Thomas; Stetter, Stephan; Albert, Mathias (2004), "The European Union and Border Conflicts: The Transformative Power of Integration". Paper to be presented at the ISA Annual Convention, Montreal, 16-21 March, www.euborderconf.bham.ac.uk  >>>

(2) - Jonathan T.Fried. Strengthening the Aid System. Notes at the Conference on ”Reshaping Globalization. Multilateral Dialogue and New Policy Initiatives”, Central European University, Budapest, October 19, 2001. P.2. >>>

(3) - Arthur Benz, Dietrich Furst. Policy Learning in Regional Networks, European Urban and Regional Studies. Vol. 9, N 1, January 2002. P. 22. >>>

(4) - Karen Dawisha and Michael Turner. "The Interaction Between Internal and External Agency in Post-Communist Transition". In: "The International Dimension of Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States of Eurasia". Edited by Karen Dawisha. Armonk, N.Y., London, England: M.E.Sharpe, 1997. Pp. 403-411. >>>

(5) - Michael McFaul. The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship. Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World, World Politics. A Quarterly Journal of International Relations. Vol. 54, N 2, January 2002. P.218. >>>

(6) - Hiski Haukkala. The Relevance of Norms and Values in the EU’s Russia Policy. A paper to be presented at the VII ICCESS World Congress in Berlin, 26 July 2005, p.3. >>>

© INTAS Project 2006

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